consideration of ens commune. 4 But exactly how such doctrines are to be understood and how they fit into the historical development of philosophy from ancient times through the medieval period has not been clear. Such was the case in part because of the lack of a critical text and in part because of the lack of studies of the Liber de causis in relation to sources. 5 Without such tools the sense of this work's doctrines could not be grasped in their proper historical context, and the role of the Liber de causis in the history of philosophy could only be a matter of tentative speculation.
Scholars pursuing a comprehensive understanding of the history of philosophy seek to incorporate into their work all that is available from historical, textual, and philosophical studies. A good example of this is perhaps the approach of Etienne Gilson to the question of the Thomistic doctrine of essence and existence in relation to developments in the history of philosophy in ancient and medieval times. In both L'Etre et l'essence 6 and the earlier Being and Some Philosophers Gilson sharply contrasts the philosophy of Plotinus with that of Thomas Aquinas on the nature of the first principle of all, stressing that the metaphysics of Plotinus is a metaphysics of the One or Unity, a kind of Henology, while holding that for Thomas Aquinas metaphysics deals with being or esse and that the first principle is Esse itself.
7 Such an understanding of Aquinas and Plotinus would appear to be well founded.
Yet while Aquinas incorporates much of the philosophical reflection on the nature of being found in the work of Aristotle and Parmenides, he also transcends their reflections in his presentation of his understanding of the divine nature. For Parmenides being is to be regarded as indivisible, continuous, 8 motionless, ungenerated, imperishable, without beginning or end, and (perhaps most importantly for the history of metaphysics) finite; "for strong Necessity holds it firm within the bonds of the limit that keeps it back on every side, because it is not lawful that what is should be unlimited; for it is not in needif it were, it would need all." 9 This "strong Necessity" is not the result of some- thing outside being, for outside it nothing is; rather, Being is self-limited and everywhere equal within its own bounds because of its very nature. 10 For Aristotle, too, being is finite, although in a different sense; and he follows Plato in maintaining the primacy of form in his understanding of being. Plato and Aristotle are both dependent on the notion of the concomitant nature of being and thought found in the Poem of Parmenides. 11 For both Plato and Aristotle the relation of being and thought yielded a conception of being as form and intelligibility. Of course, for Plato forms existing separate from the material things of the world have priority in being. 12 Aristotle, however, emphasizes the immanence of form as act and intelligibility of the individual substance or ouj siv a and views form as that which primarily deserves the name of ouj siv a. 13 He argues to the reality of a plurality of unmoved movers in book Lav mbda of his Metaphysics (the final causes which move others through the perfect finality immanent in them qua most actual instances of ouj siv a), and here he is bound by his own thought to regard these as individual and as completely actual instances of being.
14 When Aristotle says, quoting the Iliad, 15 "The rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler," he is here designating a primum inter pares, not a transcendently more complete actual instance of ouj siv a. 16 Thus it seems not at all unfair or incorrect to state that Aristotle seems not to have given serious consideration to being outside of or beyond what Aquinas would call ens commune or esse commune. Consequently, from the perspective of Aquinas one might say that, confined within a philosophical and conceptual framework set down by Parmenides as mediated by a Platonic understanding of ouj siv a as form, Aristotle never saw fit to affirm the reality of a transcendent efficient cause of being, a cause of esse commune outside esse commune, which cause is itself ipsum esse per se subsistens as we find in the thought of Aquinas.
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Plato strained at the reins or limits set by Parmenidean thought while clearly laying the foundations for the thought of Aristotle in his own Theory of Ideas 16 The only criterion for the ranking of these is the motion they cause. At any rate, as completely actual in itself, no one of the unmoved movers could be generated from another or influenced by another. This lacuna, if it is a lacuna, was filled by later thinkers (with the exception of the mature Averroes and some others) with theories of emanation and illumination. 17 See De potentia dei, q.3, a.5.
under the inspiration of Socrates and in reaction to Parmenides and the Sophists. 18 This becomes clear in a number of works but perhaps most notably in the Republic and, if we are to adopt the approach of many a Neoplatonist, the Parmenides. 19 In the Republic, after confronting Parmenidean notions in order to establish the realm of becoming, 20 Plato goes on to consider the Ideas and the Idea of the Good. 21 He puts forth the doctrine that the idea of the Good is the cause of knowledge and truth; furthermore, since truth and the forms which are the objects of knowledge are found in the realm of being, he goes on to say, "you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence [to; ei\ naiv te kai; th; n ouj siv an] is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence [ouj k ouj siv a~] but still transcends essence [e[ ti ej pev keina th` ouj siv a~] in dignity and surpassing power."
22
A Neoplatonic approach to the second section of the Parmenides might yield a similar understanding. For it can be said that in the First Hypothesis concerning the One-which-is-not, Plato analyzes that which is above the Ideas and does not partake of being at all. 23 He goes so far as to conclude that "it has no being even so as to be one, for if it were one, it would be and would partake of being" 24 and that "it is neither named nor described nor thought of nor known, nor does any existing thing perceive it."
25 It is this One-which-is-not which might be understood to stand over the One-which-is, the object of the Second Hypothesis. Whether or not this approach to these texts is consonant with what he himself thought, it is clear that Plato pressed hard at the limits imposed even by his own thought, limits ultimately rooted in notions passed on by Parmenides.
Plotinus brings a new sort of understanding, placing the very cause of being and of everything which in any way exists outside the realm of being. Setting forth the doctrine that originated being must turn back to contemplate its cause for fulfillment, 26 Plotinus held that nou` or the Intellectual Realm comes to be the source of forms for lower things. It is this being, taken together with what it causes posterior to itself, that would constitute what might correspond to esse commune or ens commune in the thought of Aquinas. And, while for Plotinus the One is itself without definition, without limit, without form, without shape, above all being and predicates found in the realm of being, the first of the three initial hypostases, the Good, for Aquinas the First Principle of all is God who is ipsum esse per se subsistens. 27 At first glance, then, there are apparent and basic parallels and similarities, but to Gilson these were only apparent.
There is a fundamental difference between the thought of Plotinus and that of Aquinas on the metaphysical understanding of the first principle, in spite of similarity. For in question 44, article 1 of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas says, It must be said that everything, that in any way is, is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes heated by fire. Now it has been shown above, when treating of the divine simplicity, that God is self-subsisting being itself [ipsum esse per se subsistens], and also that subsisting being can be only one; just as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings other than God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by the one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.
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While Plotinus refuses all names to the First Principle, the One, even the name of being, Aquinas, in this text and in many others, makes clear his understanding that God is ipsum esse per se subsistens in such a way that He is the very nature of Being as unparticipated efficient cause of being for all things that participate in being. 29 This participation of being is brought about by Divine activity which is direct and without mediation in the giving of being. For Aquinas it is the esse as participated which gives actual existence to the nature which receives it in such a way that this limiting form quidditatively and formally determines what it receives, with these two together forming the 27 entitative composition that is the existing being or creature. 30 In the teaching of Aquinas there is no confusion of Divine Being with that of creatures, just as there is no such confusion of the One with what it causes in the thought of Plotinus. Although Divine being is from God alone, since esse for Aquinas is given by efficient causality, it is not the formal being of its creatures. 31 Consequently, it must be admitted that the doctrine of Aquinas does coincide with that of Plotinus in that the First is separate from its product and in that this First is infinite and above limit, definition, and form. 32 Nevertheless, on the basis of the understandings available to him, Gilson seems to have had every right to remark that still for Plotinus it becomes perfectly clear that being no longer is the first principle, either in metaphysics or in reality. To Plotinus, being is only the second principle, above which there is to be found a higher one, so perfect in itself that it is not. More than that, it is precisely because the first principle is not being that it can be the cause of being. 33 Still, in light of similarities, can we rightly say that the ideas of Aquinas and Plotinus are radically at variance with one another? Is the difference between these two thinkers on the understanding of the first principle real or apparent? Could it not be that similar fundamental intuitions occurred separately to these two thinkers and that each expressed his thought within the philosophical tradition of the historical moment? Or could it be that the thought of Plotinus underwent modifications by one or more intermediaries and finally reached Aquinas, who examined the teaching critically and transformed it into his own?
We shall see that the Liber de causis and its proper understanding are central to any attempt to settle the issue of the historical relationship of the doctrines of Aquinas and Plotinus. Yet to understand this text one must consider also its origins in the thought of Proclus and the Plotiniana Arabica. 34 This is so even though we do know that the texts which go to make up the materials 30 The term "entitative composition" more accurately describes this than the traditional terminology derived from the word res; known as Plotiniana Arabica, namely, the Theology of Aristotle, the Sayings of the Greek Sage, and the Treatise on Divine Knowledge, were not available to Aquinas in Latin translation. Nevertheless, these played a profound part in his thinking even though the route by which they reached him was far from direct.
The Plotiniana Arabica texts consist of translations and paraphrases of sections of Enneads IV, V, and VI interlaced with additional comments and explanations. 35 The Pseudo-Aristotelian Theology of Aristotle, the longest of the three texts, consists of ten books which draw on all three Enneads. The Sayings of the Greek Sage, known for the most part from a unique manuscript at Oxford, 36 is a collection of dicta corresponding again to selected passages of Enneads IV, V, and VI. The third of the texts is the pseudo-Farabian Treatise on Divine Knowledge, based on selections from the fifth Ennead of Plotinus.
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Evidence indicates that the materials making up the Plotiniana Arabica came through Syrian Christian hands into Arabic in some form, 38 but it is nearly certain that the form that these materials now have is not that in which they came into Arabic. 36 See Plotini Opera II, XXXII-XXXIV. 37 See Plotini Opera II, XXXI-XXXII. 38 On the nature of the First, that is, the One or Good which is outside being, Plotinus clearly differs from Aquinas; for while Plotinus refuses all predicates to the One, even in the last analysis the names One and Good, Aquinas affirms that God is being as ipsum esse per se subsistens, as we have seen. Yet in the Plotiniana Arabica it is unambiguously and repeatedly affirmed that the Pure True One is that which originated or created being, and also that the first originated or created being is alc aql (intellect) which is the source of form for all other lower beings. In this, the Arabic texts are in complete agreement with the texts of Plotinus, but in contrast to Plotinus, the Plotiniana Arabica describes the Pure True One, which is also styled the Pure Good, as the "First Being [al-annîyah al-ûlâ] which is the cause of intellect, and soul and the other things" 40 and as "Pure Being" and "Being alone."
As Pines has pointed out, two fundamental theses run throughout all three Plotiniana Arabica texts. 41 First, the First Cause, the Creator and the First Agent, is described as pure being; and second, this First Cause is the cause of being and form for some things; that is, it is a complete and perfect cause, while intellect is cause of form only, not being. In the Theology of Aristotle the First is the First Being and the Creator, the cause of all beings, the First True Being, "The Creator Who is the Pure Good." 42 In the Treatise on Divine Knowledge the First Cause is called "only being" (huwîyah faqa • t), equivalent to esse tantum in Latin; the intellect which it creates is true being, wa-huwa al-annîyah al- • haqq. 43 The First is said to be "the beginning of being, and ... higher and nobler than substance, because he is the originator of substance"; and the First is "only good. The first good ... the simple which provides all things with good." 44 In the Sayings of the Greek Sage we have the following text which is of special interest here: In this way all things came to be in it but it is not in any thing except in the mode of cause.
The things are in the intellect and it is in the things. The things came to be in the intellect only because their forms are in it and from it they have unfolded in the things because it is the cause of the things below it. However, although the intellect is a cause of the things below it, it is not a complete cause of the thing because it is only the cause of the thing's form, not the cause of being [huwîyah] . The First Agent is a complete cause, for it is the cause of the being [huwîyah] and form of the thing [the intellect] without intermediary and the cause of the being of soul and the forms of things through the mediation of intellect. Soul and all things are formed in intellect without having been formed in the First Cause, rather they only emanate from It.
All intelligible things are defined [ma • hdûd] . And the definition of a thing is its shape and its form. For when the First cause created the being [huwiyah] of the things, It did not bring them about as a substrate without definition, but rather It defines them and contains them; and It defines them through their forms. So the definition of the thing produced [ash-shai' al-mafc ûl] is its form and its fixity [sukûnu-hu], and fixity is shape and definition for intelligence. And the subsistence and persistence of the intelligence and all other intelligible things is through shape and fixity. 45 In the light of this passage and others noted earlier, it seems clear that we have here a doctrine that the cause of being is itself pure being, much like the teaching of Aquinas. However, it has been pointed out by Hadot that this is not the first appearance in the history of philosophical thought for such a notion.
A similar notion is found in a Turin palimpsest containing a commentary on parts of the Parmenides of Plato, a commentary which Pierre Hadot argued to be the work of Porphyry or someone of his school 46 and which H. D. 45 Badawi, Aflû • tîn, 185.4-19. My translation is a modified version of that printed by Lewis in Plotini Opera II, 281, nn. 10-16, corresponding to Enneads V, 1, 7. Note that I render huwîyah as "being," not "identity" as it is found in the Plotini Opera. 46 Saffrey has established as in fact by Porphyry. 47 There it is maintained, in connection with the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides, which concerns the One-which-is, that where being is found to be many, there it must be participated. Furthermore, it is said that where ouj siv a and o[ n are participated, there must be posited over them something which is neither o[ n nor ouj siv a nor act but rather something which acts and is itself pure acting or actuality (auj to; to; ej nergeiǹ kaqarov n) and being itself prior to being (auj to; to; ei\ nai to; pro; tou` o [ nto~) . 48 God in this context is also termed being itself with the Greek to; ei\ nai mov non.
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The possible importance of this for the thought of Aquinas has been pointed out by Hadot. 50 Hadot has also pointed out that similar notions can be found in the know that Porphyry was held in highest esteem by many in the Syriac Christian tradition from which most of the early translators came. This is something for which we find evidence in a poetic letter of David bar Paulos (born in the mid-eighth century near Mosul), which states, "Above all the Greeks is the wise Porphyry held in honor, the master of all sciences, after the likeness of the godhead." 55 If the account of the Arabic texts were as straightforward as this, one might then argue that the source of this philosophical notion of the First Cause as pure being both in the West through Boethius and in the East through the Plotiniana Arabica texts may well be Porphyry. However, there are other interpretations. Fritz Zimmermann reasons rather persuasively for another view, contending that Porphyry is mentioned here only because of his well-known role as editor of the Enneads of Plotinus. The name of Plotinus may well have dropped out of the tradition of the text due to scribal error or physical damage to the manuscript. 56 Still, this does not exclude the influence of the sort of thinking found in the Commentary on the Parmenides by Porphyry from being at work in the Plotiniana Arabica, for late Greek philosophy (and also its understanding in the Syrian Christian tradition) was the source of this stage of Arabic philosophy. 57 Analyzing details of philosophical arguments of the texts, Cristina D'Ancona Costa has reasoned that the thought of Pseudo-Dionysius may well be at work behind this and other doctrines in the Plotiniana Arabica. 58 But problems in tracing precise historical sources need not affect appreciation of the philosophical conceptualizing found in the Plotiniana Arabica. How, then, might these philosophical notions of the being of the First Cause and its difference from its creatures or products found in the Plotiniana Arabica have been passed on to Aquinas?
In general the Plotiniana Arabica texts can be characterized as texts foundational for a large part of Islamic philosophy, as well as important for mystical and religious thought in Islam. They function as a kind of doxastic source of a philosophical character of considerable authority for nearly all Islamic philosophical thinkers. 59 Of the major philosophical thinkers, we 55 can say with certainty that al-Kindi was familiar with some, perhaps even all, of these materials as was al-Farabi who drew on the Theology of Aristotle explicitly in his book on the Harmony of the Opinions of the Two Sages. 60 Also, al-Farabi's fundamental theory of emanation of all beings from the First Being is clearly dependent on the inspiration of the Plotiniana Arabica texts. The chief inspiration for the notion of the First Cause as pure being and of the theory of emanation in the thought of Avicenna is certainly the work of al-Farabi. 61 Moreover, we know that Avicenna read the Theology of Aristotle itself, for he has left glosses on the Theology. 62 In view of this it is not difficult to see that the doctrine of the First as the Necessary Being in the thought of Avicenna had as an important source the Theology of Aristotle. Moreover, as Pines remarks, the consideration of the Plotiniana Arabica texts may well provide some fruitful insights into Avicenna's view of the nature and ontological status of essences. 63 Thus, in the thought of Avicenna as expressed in his works translated into Latin, the notion of the First as Pure Being, as the Pure Good, as the ultimate efficient cause for all beings through a process of necessary emanation, has roots in the Plotiniana Arabica. To the extent that Aquinas was influenced by the works of Avicenna on these matters, it is the Plotiniana Arabica texts and perhaps Porphyry or Porphyrian ideas which are ultimately responsible. But there is another Arabic source which influenced the thought of Aquinas on this, that is, the Liber de causis. 67 It has also been confirmed in some detail by Pera who prepared an edition of Aquinas's Commentary. 68 In 1982 a critical edition of the Arabic text of the Liber de causis was prepared, 69 providing the opportunity for a thoroughgoing study of the made it possible to see clearly that the modifications of the text of Proclus have been made in accordance with this. This has been confirmed and elaborated upon in considerable detail by D'Ancona Costa in a number of valuable articles relating to this topic.
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The following is a translation of the eighth proposition of the Arabic Liber de causis, for which there is no corresponding text in the Elements of Theology of Proclus. The text is clearly dependent on modified Plotinian thought, something easily apparent in the light of the text I quoted earlier from the Sayings of the Greek Sage.
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The persistence and subsistence of every intellect is through the Pure Good which is the First Cause.
The power of the intellect has stronger unity than the secondary things which are after it, because they do not attain to its knowledge. This has come to be so only because it is cause of what is below it. The proof of that is what we state: the intellect exercises providence over all the things below it through the divine power which is present in it. And by [that power] it keeps hold on the things because through [that power] it is the cause of the things and it keeps hold on and contains all the things below it. For everything which is first for the things and a cause of them keeps hold on those things and exercises providence over them and none of them eludes it owing to its exalted power.
The intellect, then, is the ruler of all the things below it, keeping hold on them and exercising providence over them, just as nature exercises providence over the things which are below it through the power of the intellect. And likewise the intellect exercises providence over nature through Divine Power. The intellect came to keep hold on the things after it and to exercise providence over them and to exalt its power over them only because they are not a substantial power for it, but rather it is the power of substantial powers because it is cause of them.
The intellect contains comings-into-being and nature and what is above nature, namely soul, for it is above nature. For nature contains coming-into-being and soul contains nature and intellect contains soul. The intellect, therefore, contains all things. And the intellect has come to be so only owing to the First Cause which is exalted over all things because It is the cause of intellect, soul, nature and all other things. 72 See her Recherches sur le Liber de causis. 73 See above pp. 9-10.
The First Cause [, however,] is not intellect nor soul nor nature, but rather It is above intellect, soul and nature because It is creator of all things. However, It is creator of intellect without mediation and creator of soul, nature and all other things through the mediation of intellect. [Moreover,] Divine Knowledge is not like intellectual knowledge nor like the knowledge of soul, but rather it is above the knowledge of intellect and the knowledge of soul because it is creator of all types of knowledge. And Divine Power is above every intellectual, psychic and natural power because It is cause of every power.
The 75 is the Pure Good which pours forth all goods upon the intellect and upon all other things through the mediation of the intellect. 76 The inspiration for this text seems to come from selections from Enneads V and VI in which the One, Mind, Soul, and Nature are discussed and appear to be quite in line with those noted earlier. 77 The First Cause is the Creator of intelligence or nou` and through it, creates all other things. In other chapters of the Liber de causis, in particular chapter 17, in a section which does not correspond to a text in Proclus, the author explicitly states that the First Cause gives being (huwîyah) through creation while the intelligence gives to what is below it by way of form, not by way of creation.
[T]he First Being is quiescent and is the cause of causes, and when he gives all things being, he gives it by way of creation. The first life gives life to what is below it not by way of creation but by way of form. And likewise the intelligence gives knowledge and the other things to what is below it only by way of form, not by way of creation, because creation belongs to the First Cause alone. 78 This, taken together with the description of the First Cause as "only being" and as being without shape, that is, without morfhv or form, clearly shows that the Liber de causis belongs among the Plotiniana Arabica texts. This is also confirmed by more detailed study of similarities of other teachings and as well of stylistic and vocabulary parallels.
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As indicated above, Aquinas made extensive use of the Liber de causis throughout his lifetime, and he made considerable use of proposition eight of the Liber de causis, the section not dependent on the Elements of Theology of Proclus but rather on Plotinian thought as found in the Plotiniana Arabica texts. For example, in the De Ente et essentia Aquinas made explicit use of chapter eight of the Liber de causis in explaining that the separate substance of intelligence "is form and being and that it holds its being from the first being, which is being in all its purity; and this is the first cause, God." 80 Aquinas says much the same in his Super librum de causis expositio, where he comments in detail on this chapter.
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There can be no question but that the Liber de causis and thereby the Plotiniana Arabica played an important role in the formation of the thought of Aquinas. Considering his use of the Liber de causis and the importance of some Avicennian intuitions for the thought of Aquinas, we are certainly justified in concluding that the thought found in the Plotiniana Arabica, received both directly in the Liber de causis and indirectly in the texts of Avicenna, were of substantial influence in the formation of Aquinas's thought on the notion of God as Ipsum Esse. It may be that the ultimate responsibility for this belongs significantly to Porphyry. In any case it is clear that Plotinus-in modified form-played an important part in the formation of the thought of Aquinas. Can a strong case be made for doctrinal similarity on this philosophical issue independent of the historical transmission of texts? Such is the contention of Lloyd Gerson, who argues that Plotinus's use of "the concept of ej nev rgeia, particularly in reference to the One, is most un-Aristotelian."
82 Citing Enneads 5.4.2.27-39 83 and other texts, 84 Gerson argues that Plotinus has developed an understanding of ej nev rgeia which makes it possible to hold that the One, while beyond ouj siv a in accord with Plato's famous conception of the Good in the Republic as ej pev keina th` ouj siv a( 509B), is nevertheless not without all existence whatsoever. Rather, "for the One to be the aj rchv of all it cannot be deprived of ej nev rgeia. To deny energeia of it would be to deny causal efficacy to it. For being an efficient cause means acting as an efficient cause." 85 Gerson's argument, then, is that Plotinus has reached "a primary energeia" 86 which is the One as activity or actuality. His textual foundations for this come from parts of Enneads 6.8:
Nor should we be afraid to assume that the first activity [ej nev rgeia] is without substance [ouj siv a~], but posit this very fact as his, so to speak, existence [uJ pov stasin]. But if one posited an existence without activity, the principle would be defective and the most perfect of all imperfect. And if one adds activity one does not keep the One. If then the activity is more perfect than the substance, and the first is most perfect, the first will be activity. 87 In his activity, therefore, he is already this first, and it cannot be that he was before he came to be, but already altogether was. Now certainly an activity not enslaved to substance is purely and simply free, and in this way he himself is himself from himself [ 83 There is an Arabic text corresponding to this which Lewis renders as follows: "The First Agent acts while in repose and in stability. But part of His activity is substance, and part is from substance. The act which is substance is His first act, whereas the act from substance, which comes into being from His act, is the second agent. The second agent necessarily follows the First Agent, but is different from that act, because the <first> act occurred without motion, while the second act occurred with motion" (Lewis, 337.173-175; Arabic in Kraus, 380-81). 84 Gerson, "Plotinus's Metaphysics," 566 n.23: "Cf. Enneads 2.6.9.14-23, 2.9.8. Gerson's interpretation of the thought of Plotinus on the nature of the One is a matter of some controversy and beyond the scope of this article. However, it is clear that an interpretation of Plotinus along these lines is easily seen to be in accord with the teachings in Porphyry's Commentary on the Parmenides. As indicated above, this doctrine holds for the being of a First Principle which is auj to; to; ej nergeiǹ kaqarov n, pure actuality itself, and being itself prior to being, auj to; to; ei\ nai to; pro; tou` o[ nto~. It is this sort of understanding of the One which Gerson asserts Plotinus to argue for in Enneads 6.8. Moreover, in accord with the suggestions of Hadot, 89 it may well be that Porphyry had in mind this and other passages of 6.8, specifically its discussion of being and actuality, as he wrote his Commentary on the Parmenides.
Of particular interest is language of Plotinus in 6.8.16, where the One is "an actualization of himself," ej nergei` auj toṽ (6.8.16.18); "His being then comes by and from himself " (par j auj tou` a[ ra auj twae` kai; ej x auj tou` to; ei\ nai, 6.8.16.37).
90 What is at issue for Plotinus in 6.8 is the question of freedom and internal and external necessity in relation to the One, but these issues require metaphysical discussion of the very nature of the One, issues pursued in similar terms by Porphyry in his Commentary. At 6.8.4.24-29 Plotinus sets the terms and language of the discussion to follow: "But how is a simple nature and single active actuality [ closely similar to that put forth both by Porphyry in his Commentary on the Parmenides and by the author or authors of the Plotiniana Arabica. These all espouse an understanding of the One as pure actuality or pure activity transcending substance (ouj siv a) and the definiteness and finitude associated with substance in the earlier Greek tradition. In the Arabic tradition and in Porphyry, however, the One also came to be denominated "Pure Being" and "Being alone" and the like.
In light of this, it seems hardly controversial for present day researchers to draw conclusions about the relationship of the thought of Plotinus and Thomas Aquinas quite different from those held by Gilson. Whether or not it is the correct interpretation of Plotinus, it is clear that the Arabic tradition was much influenced by an understanding of the True One or Good in the Plotiniana Arabica quite in accord with the Porphyrian doctrine in the Turin palimpsest, that the First Principle of all is Pure Actuality and that all other things participate in actuality. In the Plotiniana Arabica the notion of the First Principle as Pure Being seems naturally to have led to the doctrine of the Liber de causis on mediate creation, namely, that the First Being (al-huwîyatu al-ûlà) alone gives being by creation (Proposition 17 [18] ) and that being given by the First Cause is the foundation for any other perfections or characteristics in a thing (Proposition 1). 95 Aquinas received much metaphysical inspiration from many diverse sources, including Aristotle, Augustine, Boethius, Avicenna, Averroes, Pseudo-Dionysius, Sacred Scripture, William of Auvergne, and Albertus Magnus; but from all these he selected and used what he deemed sound and clearly made his own only so much tradition as he saw fit to pass on as true. In the case of the texts considered in this article, Aquinas made his own the notion of God as ipsum esse and esse tantum and was in agreement with the Plotiniana Arabica that the First Cause is pure actuality. 96 He also was in agreement that creation properly so called belongs to God alone.
Let me conclude by summarizing some of the links or connections which have been made in this article. First, textual links between the thought of Plotinus and the Plotiniana Arabica are obvious. Second, textual links between the thought of Aquinas and that of the Liber de causis are equally obvious. Third, terminology and doctrine textually associate the Liber de causis and the Plotiniana Arabica, with the likelihood that the Liber de causis is posterior to the Plotiniana Arabica and that in any case they are 95 closely connected and appear to stem from a single philosophical approach. Fourth, some similarity of terminology (the use and understanding of the terms ej nev rgeia or ej nergeiǹ) may be said to indicate the likelihood of a connection of the thought of Plotinus on the One in Enneads 6.8 and that of the Porphyry in his Commentary on the Parmenides. Plotiniana Arabica texts corresponding to sections of Plotinus's Enneads 6.7 and 6.9 are extant. If there was an Arabic version of 6.8 (where the doctrine of the One as transcendent actuality is entertained by Plotinus), it may well have contained an account of the One as actuality similar to what we find in Porphyry. It may be, then, that a lost Arabic text of 6.8-or a knowledge of the doctrine of 6.8 on the part of the translators-is a key source for the doctrine of pure actuality.
What sort of doctrinal or philosophical links can be made? First, the doctrine of the First Principle or First Cause as pure being and as only being as read by Aquinas in the Liber de causis can be traced to the Plotiniana Arabica or its source which transformed Greek Neoplatonic thinking on the One into a metaphysics of being. To this extent, the doctrine can be said to be at the origins of the Islamic philosophical tradition. Secondly, philosophical doctrine seems to link the Porphyrian teaching on the First Principle to Plotinus as a possible understanding based on an interpretation of Enneads 6.8.4-20 along the lines suggested by Gerson. Third, Porphyrian philosophical understanding is doctrinally similar to that of the Plotiniana Arabica in virtue of its teaching on the First Principle both as pure being and as pure actuality or activity. Fourth, it may not be necessary to bring Porphyry into the picture at all insofar as the doctrines in the Plotiniana Arabica on the First Cause as being and actuality can quite plausibly be read as what would be expected from a Plotiniana Arabica version of Enneads 6.8.4-20. Fifth, although the notion of God as pure actuality does not occur explicitly in the Liber de causis, it perhaps can be seen as a natural consequence of other doctrines in the Liber de causis and other philosophical materials available in the Arabic tradition. Finally, Aquinas can be said to have been influenced by these and other Arabic philosophical materials as well as philosophical and theological materials from the Latin tradition, but his critical synthesis of these notions into his own doctrine of Essence and Existence is a new and exciting philosophical development building upon but not identical with what preceded him in the history of philosophy.
Clearly, the Liber de causis has a central place in the Medieval metaphysical corpus for its transmission to the Latin West of philosophical notions about the nature of being and the nature of the First Principle developed out of the Plotinian tradition. To the Latin West this was a significant contribution and the Liber de causis was recognized as important. But the evi- 97 
